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Emerging Issues in
Agricultural Trade and the Environment
C. Ford Runge
Introduction and Overview
This paper outlines emerging issues in agricultural trade and the environment.  Its
intent is to provoke discussion, rather than to capture all of the issues and details that merit
analysis.  It focuses primarily on "micro" issues rather than global issues such as green
house gas emissions or biodiversity, although these are in many respects simply the
aggregation of questions that must be resolved by changes in practices and incentives at the
farm level.  It begins with a description of the stylized facts of trade-environment
interactions, arguing that the widely cited "Kuznets function" underscores our ignorance
concerning the mechanisms linking growth, trade, and pollution.  Especially in agriculture,
there is evidence that market and government failures have not yet led to substantial
interventions to reduce environmental externalities.  The second part of the paper discusses
these mechanisms, and raises a set of research questions designed to guide OECD and other
investigators toward a more detailed understanding of the linkages from trade to
environment in agriculture.  The third part of the paper explores the challenges posed for
trade policy-making, touching on two of the most important future areas in agriculture: 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs),
and offers some policy principles to advance agricultural sustainability.  The final part of
the paper raises some of the challenges likely to face the WTO as it grapples with these and
other trade-environment issues in the next century.￿
Stylized Facts and the Kuznets Function
In the absence of a substantial body of empirical research, the short experience with
trade and environmental policy interactions in agriculture has left us with a few stylized
facts.  These stylized facts have some rudimentary empirical support, but are far from well-
understood.  Perhaps the most important (although not specific to agriculture), is the
Kuznets or inverted-U function that has been calculated for a variety of environmental
pollutants, showing that as income (GDP/capita) grows, some pollutants rise, but then fall
at a threshold level of income (see Figure 1).  Appendix 1 summarizes most of the available
evidence on this relationship.  Appendix Table 1 provides a summary of a number of
studies examining the data sources, pollution measures, media and results, as well as the
level of GDP per capita at which various pollution levels peak.  It is noteworthy that despite
broad support for the Kuznets function, the thresholds at which pollutants turn downward
are often very high, and some do not turn downward at the limits of the data.  Sanguine
interpretations of these findings, suggesting an automatic pollution-reducing response to
income growth, are not supported.
Lucas (Appendix Table 2), in a separate analysis, has looked not only at the relation
of environmental indicators to GDP/capita, but specifically at the relation between various
environmental indicators and trade-openness measured by exports/GDP, finding that many
pollutants are unassociated with export openness, and some indicators, such as wilderness
area, are positively associated with openness, while deforestation is negatively associated
with it.  Naturally, his findings require replication and further analysis.  In a recent report
for the World Resource Institute (Appendix Table 3), I and others examined the relation
between changes in export shares in Latin America and the Caribbean for numerous ISICFigure  1.  Income  and  Pollution 
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sectors, and found that the highest polluting sectors were basic metals, industrial chemicals
and non-metal products, whilst the lowest were textiles and apparel, metal products and
food products.  When export growth in these sectors was examined, it was by no means
clear that export share was growing more rapidly in the highly polluting sectors; if
anything, the opposite trend seemed better supported (Runge, et. al., 1997).  While Mexico
was the only OECD country considered, the methodology employed is easily generalizable
to other OECD countries.  We also examined trends in the agricultural sector, to which I
shall return.
The most important consequence of these studies is to draw attention to what we do
not know, both across sectors, and particularly within sectors such as agriculture, about
trade-environment interactions, inside and outside the OECD.  In this paper, I will focus
on some of the reasons for our lack of understanding, and propose the elements of a
research and policy agenda for OECD member governments and the WTO as they prepare
for the next round of multilateral trade negotiations.  The discussion begins with
consideration of the mechanisms which link trade to changes in environmental quality in
agriculture.  It then moves to the most important policy challenge:  how to establish this
linkage in ways that promote reinforcing increases in market access and environmental
quality.  I will call this the virtuous path:  increased market access leading to trade and
income growth, out of which resources can and are devoted to environmental
improvements.  In contrast, but no less possible, are policies leading to a vicious path: 
denial of market access (justified in part or in whole on environmental grounds) leading to
reduced trade and income, further reducing the resources that can be devoted to
environmental initiatives.  The paper concludes with a set of questions relevant to the WTO
and its future program.￿
Mechanisms of Linkage
The mechanisms by which trade affects environment are not revealed by inverted U-
shaped functions, which hide the technological and political choices leading nations and
individuals to respond to pollution as a "public bad."  These market failures demand
attention to the incentives of individuals and nations to engage in collective actions to
reduce these negative agricultural externalities over time (see Sandler, 1997).  This leads to
a decomposition of the impacts of trade on the environment which can allow us to discern
if, how and why certain trends in the data occur.  Let me sketch five such impacts of trade
on the physical environment with special attention (although without loss of generality) to
agriculture (see Runge, 1995).
The first and most celebrated (since Adam Smith) is allocative efficiency, the
persuasive argument that specialization and comparative advantage more efficiently utilize
natural resources than policies of national or local self-sufficiency, a view in direct contrast
to extreme advocates of local self-reliance or food security.  In agriculture, natural
resources are likely to be more efficiently utilized if those countries with comparative
advantages (say in grains or tropical products) produce them and trade for others.  It is
unlikely to be an efficient use of natural capital to produce and consume everything locally. 
The second effect of trade is on the scale of economic activity, involving the question of
whether large scale economic activity creates more ecological "wear and tear."  In
agriculture, there are some strong arguments that excessive scale, brought on in part by
trade, may lead to substantial environmental stresses, especially in the livestock sector (see
Runge, 1998).  The third effect is on the sectoral composition of output:  are more or less￿
ecologically threatening sectors favored by trade?  In the case of a specific sector such as
agriculture, a deeper question concerns intrasectoral composition,   For example, does trade
encourage excessive production of more highly polluting crops such as cotton at the expense
of small grains?  A fourth way in which trade may affect the environment is by inducing
technological innovation and transfer -- of both goods and bads.  In the case of agriculture
international diffusion of agricultural technology has been blamed for some of the excessive
use of inputs such as fertilizers and agrichemicals, but has also allowed technologies used in
soil conserving reduced tillage to be practiced more and more widely on crops such as corn
and soybeans (Conservation Tillage Technology Center, 1997).  A final, and perhaps the
critical impact is on policy -- and politics.  Whilst rising incomes may make environmental
protection more affordable, the ultimate question is not only whether nations are able to
pay for such protection, but whether they are willing to pay and can reveal this preference
through the political process.  Market failure is thus joined by the possibility of government
failure in causing negative environment impacts to which societies fail to respond.  In
agriculture, this is a particularly vexing question.  Despite a growing body of evidence
demonstrating the broad environmental impacts of agriculture (only some of which are
trade-related), the agricultural sector has continued to avoid the degree of environmental
regulatory oversight common in many other sectors (Kalt, 1985).  This is true not only in
low- but also in high-income countries, clearly implying that income growth is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for environmental improvements in agriculture (Runge, et.
al., 1994; Ervin, 1997a).￿
Schematically (Figure 2), we can think of trade liberalization in agriculture as
inducing some allocative efficiencies, leading to increased income growth and GDP per
capita, with some negative scale effects.  If these effects lead to increases in demand for
environmental protection, revealed in a political process, then changes in environmental
policy, and induced technical changes and shifts in composition are more likely.  But the
critical possibility for disconnection, assuming at least some negative scale effects are not
overcome by allocative efficiencies and market-based technologies, is whether the political
process responds to the need to reduce environmental externalities in agriculture over time.
We can think of this problem in terms of an "endogenous" Kuznets function, in
which social choices are made to foreshorten the path by which pollutants are reduced over
time (see Figure 3).  The question is whether the social resources necessary to effect this
reduction are available, and, furthermore, whether collective decisions are made to reduce
pollution at a more rapid rate.
This question lies at the heart of the debate over trade and environment.  Obviously,
the political process at both the national and the international level is only beginning to
respond -- and grudgingly, to the negative environmental impacts of agriculture, in part
because of the centrality of food security in national policies.  Moreover, the data suggests
that such responses are much less likely at lower levels of income, even in well-functioning
democracies.  In the United States and Western Europe, environmental responsibility and
even corporate environmental activism are very much in favor with the public and a large
part of the private sector.  Even so, agriculture has largely escaped much of this oversight
(Ervin, et. al., 1998).  But in most developing countries, environmental regulation isFigure  3.  Income  and  Pollution 
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regarded as at best an affectation of the rich, and at worst an excuse to deny market access
to Third World exporters as a form of "green protection."  The central conundrum facing
global environmental policy in agriculture is how to connect incentives for upward
harmonization of environmental standards to the dynamic process of trade liberalization,
while avoiding the use of "environmental conditionality" as an excuse for closing off
market access (see Runge, et. al., 1997; Vogel, 1995).  Before examining these issues from a
policy perspective, let me summarize the implications of the discussion thusfar.
The impacts of trade on the environment illustrated in Figure 2 imply the need for
OECD research organized around the following difficult questions:
(1) How much has trade liberalization driven changes in agricutural practices
(with both positive and negative environmental effects) in various OECD
countries to date, and how will it affect these practices in the future?
(2) Will increases in allocative efficiency reflecting comparative advantages in
agriculture result in resource conservation, and if so, how can this
"conservation via efficiency" be promoted (e.g., through adoption of
conservation tillage)?
(3) As national income growth occurs, what share should be reserved to
compensate for negative externalities in agriculture?  How can intrasectoral
environmental issues (e.g., cotton versus small grains) be given priority?
(4) Have trade-induced scale (pollution) effects in agriculture been adequately
assessed, allowing estimates contributing to their remediation as in (3)?
(5) What is the structure of demand for (a) environmental quality as a public￿￿
good, and the (b) remediation of public bads and externalities from
agriculture?
(6) What is the derived demand from (5) for changes in environmental policy,
and how can such policies be successfully coordinated across OECD and
developing countries?
(7) What technological processes and product characteristics can best promote
environmental improvements in agriculture, without interfering with freer
trade?
A more detailed set of research questions is developed in Appendix Table 4.
Virtuous and Vicious Trade and Environment Linkages
One of the conundrums of trade-environment interactions is that the constructive
reinforcement of trade expansion and environmental improvement can so easily give way to
a destructive spiral of protectionism and environmental damages.  On the one hand, it is
clear that poor countries do not protect their environment (except in the sense that they do
not exploit their natural resources) because they cannot afford the technical choices and
policies that would allow them to do so.  Hence, economic growth, especially through the
exploitation of comparative advantage via trade, appears a necessary condition for many
environmental improvements.  But while necessary, the available evidence (especially in
agriculture) indicates that growth through trade is far from sufficient (Ervin, 1997a).  In
order to assure a virtuous path of trade-environment interactions, technical and policy
decisions must be made that mitigate whatever damages increased trade may bring, and￿￿
promote principles such as that the polluter pays (see Figure 4).  This is demonstrated as a
matter of theory as well as practice (Anderson, 1992).  Unfortunately, in much of the
OECD, there is greater evidence of paying the polluter in agricultural policy than of the
polluter pays principle (Runge, 1995).
On the other hand, it is equally possible that countries may be denied market access,
in part or in whole on grounds of environmental protection, where the primary motive is
not environment, but trade.  This is a particular concern of developing countries, who see
in many environmental standards nothing other than nontariff trade barriers and is an
especially acute problem in agriculture.  As market access to these countries is denied, it
not only reduces their economic growth, and resulting capacity to mount environmental
initiatives; it also reinforces a view of environmental standards and policies as affectations
of the rich (see Figure 5).
Let me offer an example of each type of interaction, and suggest why the slope from
a virtuous to a vicious linkage can be slippery.  A first case is NAFTA, and its extension to a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Agreement (see Tiefer, 1998).  In the broadest
sense, the linkage of environmental side agreements to the NAFTA text demonstrated a
recognition that market access (especially to U.S. markets by Mexico) could be successfully
traded for commitments to improve Mexico's environmental technology, infrastructure and
policies.  Despite difficulties in implementing this commitment, the establishment of the
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) in Montreal is
tangible evidence that new institutions dedicated to mitigating trade-related environmental
damages can be created.  Among the most prominent of the CEC's Nafta Effects Projects is
a study of￿￿
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the agricultural sector, focusing on the beef cattle feeding industry in the U.S. and Canada
and the white corn sector in Mexico (see Runge and Fox, 1998; Nadal, 1998).  Yet in the
further negotiations over an FTAA, many Latin American nations questioned whether
such increased market access was worth the environmental conditionality it might imply
(see Runge, et. al., 1997).  There is analytical support for the proposition that while
environmental interests are often served by such a linkage, it complicates and may reduce
the probability of successful trade negotiations, a result confirmed in the stalled "fast
track" authority necessary to move the FTAA forward (Hauer and Runge, forthcoming). 
In the context of the FTAA, and the parallel development of Mercosur, we specifically
examined some trade-environment interactions in agriculture in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Runge, et. al., 1997).  In general, there is evidence that older, import
substitution policies had distorted farmers' incentives, leading to the misuse of various
inputs.  However, in the face of liberalization, expanded scale effects may also threaten
environmental quality.  
Several examples of these impacts are noted in the case of Argentina by Cap (1996). 
A spectacular increase in the area subject to groundwater irrigation in the Pampean
Region of Argentina is one such case.  Although hard data on actually irrigated areas are
not yet available, sales of irrigation equipment are booming and analysts estimate that one
million hectares of corn and wheat may be irrigated by the turn of the century.  The source
of water used for this irrigation is the Puelches aquifer.  Current information on the
present and potential depletion rate as well as the recharging capacity of this aquifer is
lacking.  Partly as a consequence, no regulations exist specifying minimum distances     
1This response to differential pesticide uses is related to the larger claim that more open trade
encourages the development of "pollution havens."  For an empirical refutation of this claim, see
Mani and Wheeler (1998).
￿￿
between wells or other practices affecting the property rights of those extracting water. 
The implications of the potential impact of this process on a critical component of the
resource base of that region could be very serious.  In the same region (the Pampas), other
input use intensity has also skyrocketed.  It has been estimated that for the planting season
1996, some 60 percent of the wheat was fertilized.  In 1990, it was less than 10 percent. 
Resulting increases in concentrations of nitrates in groundwater will be the inevitable
result.  New conservation tillage techniques being adopted by farmers at a rate well above
trend also implies the use of larger quantities of herbicides than before.  While costs and
soil erosion rates may decline, polluted water sources will rise.
The Latin American experience suggests that most governments, including Mexico,
are only beginning to make political and technical choices which might reduce or remediate
environmental damages from agriculture.  While the first part of the virtuous path (trade
expansion and income growth) has begun, it is far from clear whether resources can and
will be set aside to internalize environmental externalities in agriculture.
Having acknowledged that even a virtuous path is difficult to follow, let us turn now
to the less virtuous and more vicious possibilities.  One is the continued attempt by U.S.
congressional interests to restrict imports of fruits and vegetables from competitive
producers in Mexico, Central and South America on the grounds that the pesticides used in
these countries are not approved or are banned in the U.S.  This "circle of poison"
legislation, not surprisingly, has its origins with California fruit and vegetable interests.
1 ￿￿
Such import restrictions are justified largely on environmental and public health grounds,
but call for import restrictions that raise many troubling issues for trade policy.  The first
and most obvious is the "extrajurisdictionality" of proposed U.S. actions against countries
to which U.S. law does not extend; the second is the application of import restrictions not
only to products, but to the process by which these products are grown and marketed.  To
the extent that such policies (including a wide range of sanitary and phytosanitary [SPS]
measures) are pursued, trade policy may purport to protect the (U.S.) environment, but it
will also close off market access, reducing incomes and the eventual capacity to mount
"greener" production methods where these fruits and vegetables originate.
Such vicious interactions are especially likely to occur in two relatively new areas: 
SPS measures, and the rapidly emerging sphere of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 
While these issues intersect with one another, it is useful to separate them out for analysis. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on SPS represented recognition by the multilateral trading
system that nontariff barriers are a major source of trade distortion, and are likely to grow
over time.  This is especially true where food and agriculture meet environmental and
health concerns:  the province of SPS.  To date, however, implementing the SPS agreement
has been difficult.  Roberts (1998) notes in an evaluation of the Uruguay Round Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS):
The challenge before the negotiators of the SPS Agreement was to create a
set of rules which would strike the proper balance between allowing
protection while disallowing regulatory protectionism.  There are clearly
public good arguments that make some SPS restrictions necessary to insure a
safe food supply and protect the domestic environment from pests and
diseases.  In other cases, regulations rationalized on technical grounds seem
to lack firm scientific foundations and, at least from the perspective of￿￿
exporting countries, seem to be imposed primarily to thwart the commercial
opportunities created by other trade liberalization policies...If the negotiators
were successful, the SPS Agreement will be regarded as an important
institutional innovation that counterbalances the influences of domestic
interest groups that successfully lobby for SPS measures which lower net
social welfare by restricting imports that pose negligible health or
environmental risks (p. 2).
However, as Josling (1994) noted 
Although many view the new SPS Agreement as a significant advance, it
is difficult to say how effective it will be in curbing trade disputes arising
from health and safety standards.  It could also lead to unwarranted changes
in such standards.  Many environmental and consumer groups fear that
there will be an erosion of standards in the name of freer trade.  The
significance of these trade rules may soon be apparent.  There are many
important issues, such as inconsistent regulations on the use of Bovine
Somatotropin in dairy production, different approaches to food irradiation,
and disparate requirements for food labelling which threaten to burst on the
trade scene and test these new SPS procedures (p. 17).
The second area of emerging significance is agricultural biotechnology, or GMOs. 
These have been the subject of intense scientific interest and scrutiny for at least two
decades.  It is only in the last 3-5 years, however, that marketable products have emerged
from this research that now promise to transform the agricultural landscape, affecting the
environment, trade and food production in ways that are still largely unknown.  The
environmental, trade and food policy communities, in particular, have yet to formulate
responses to the rapid emergence of biotechnologies in key commodities such as corn and
soybeans.  Beginning in crop year 1996, newly released varieties of genetically-engineered
soybeans and corn (as well as cotton) were marketed in the U.S. for the first time.  These     
2Bt stands for Bacillus thuringiensis, a bacterium present in soils that acts as a natural
insecticide.  This bacterium has been genetically engineered to be present in the corn plant
itself, creating resistance to the European corn borer.
￿￿
seeds, including Roundup-Ready® soybeans and Bt corn
2 are genetically engineered with
traits that offer improved yield or other performance characteristics in the face of weeds or
pests.  Roundup Ready® soybeans, for example, are impervious to the effects of glyphosate
(Round-up®), a widely-used herbicide, allowing reduced total herbicide applications and
better targeting of weed control, as well as fewer passes through the field.  Bt corn is
genetically engineered to resist the European corn borer, a widely encountered corn pest,
thus reducing the need for insecticide applications.  Sales of both of these seeds have been
brisk, growing from a few percentage points of total soybean and corn sales in 1996 to an
estimated 10 percent for RR soybeans and perhaps 5 percent of total corn seed sales for Bt
corn in 1997.  In 1998, sales of modified soybean varieties will capture over 30 percent of
the U.S. market.  These seeds are only the first generation of what are expected to be a
growing stream of genetically engineered seed varieties, known in trade circles as
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs).
These dramatic developments have left a number of key issues unresolved.  Each of
these issues concerns a form of market failure.  The first of these is the distribution of
benefits and costs associated with the new "super seeds."  As these technologies move
through the product cycle from lead markets in developed countries such as the U.S., and
into developing countries, will their benefits be proportional to the increased costs of
utilizing them?  How will they relate to questions of agricultural scale, and to small farmers
in particular?     
3While this possibility is considered remote in the case of soybeans, other genetically
engineered crops, such as genetically engineered canola, have closer relatives (e.g., wild
mustard) in which the transfer of resistance is more possible.
￿￿
A second issue related to possible market failures concerns the concentration of
industrial control over these technologies.  As a result of breakneck merger and acquisition
activity in the U.S. and Europe, a relatively small number of large agricultural input and
pharmaceutical companies are coming to dominate research and technology in the field of
crop biotechnology.  On the one hand, this will allow huge expenditures on the technology
and its dissemination.  On the other hand, the control and concentration of the industry
raises questions over access to the technology and the use of market power to extract
monopoly rents.
A third area of market failure relates to a number of externality and public goods
questions, involving biological and ecological risks.  The two primary risks are that
herbicide resistance may be transferred from genetically engineered plants to close plant
relatives that are undesirable, including numerous weed pests.
3  The second is that plant
resistance to insect pests will in turn cause insect mutations and counter-resistance,
creating new and even more virulent insect pests.  In order to prevent such mutations from
taking hold, it is generally stipulated that farmers planting the insect resistent varieties
continue to reserve a portion of their fields ("refugia") for traditional non-resistent crops,
thus ensuring the survival of a pool of non-resistent insects.
Related to these market failures are several key features that make them emblematic
of issues of sustainability in agriculture.  The first feature is that the commercial and even
the environmental benefits of crop biotechnology occur sooner in time than the risks.  The￿￿
avoidance of weed and insect pests occurs as soon as the crop is planted and harvested,
together with the tillage and insecticide reductions noted above.  The development of weeds
and insects even more resistent to herbicides or insecticides, in contrast, will follow in
future generations of plants and insects.  No one knows how rapidly such resistance will
occur (if it occurs at all), but it will certainly be further in the future than the current crop
year.  A fundamental principle of economics holds that insofar as individuals give greater
weight to current as opposed to future consumption and production, they will discount
future risks relative to current benefits, in effect downgrading the significance of costs to
future generations.
The second feature is that the risks of plants and insect resistance, if they occur, will
be spread over a landscape that includes many growers of crops, and are in no way likely to
be borne solely by the adopter of the new varieties.  The fact that these risks are not
internalized makes them a form of spatial externality, in which the costs of resistance are
spread widely, while the benefits, at least initially, are concentrated in the hands of early
adopters.  Hence, the spatial externalization of risks interacts with the temporal asymmetry
noted above, as early adopters push risks both outward in space and forward in time.
A third feature of the benefits and risks associated with crop biotechnology involves
the disincentives of farmers to reserve a portion of their fields as refugia to create a
preserve for insects that lack resistance to the new varieties.  These disincentives arise
because the benefits of such refugia are not fully captured by the farmers.  Indeed, the
crops in refugia will be vulnerable to the very pests against which farmers seek to insure by
adopting the new varieties.  The benefits are thus partly public goods, insofar as they￿￿
return to all farmers seeking to maintain the efficacy of the new insect-resistant varieties. 
However, refugia are also designed to protect the investments of large seed and chemical
companies by prolonging the efficacy of the new seed varieties.  As in all cases of public
goods, farmers have an incentive to free ride by shirking their responsibilities to maintain
refugia, thus undercutting the long-term efficacy of the new varieties, and coincidentally
reducing the long term payback to private investors.  Finally, and ironically, insofar as
private investors anticipate this behavior, they may seek to maximize short run sales of seed
at the expense of maintaining refugia reserves.
These environmental issues are linked in turn to trade.  The proliferation of GMOs
has catalyzed international debate on world trade policy and standardization.  The United
States and the European Union (EU) have sparred over the validity of trade restrictions on
these agricultural products.  The United States, an exporter of GMOs to Europe, is
advocating free trade in these materials.  The current EU proposal is to mandate labeling of
all agricultural products containing GMOs.  This implies the need for standards for GMOs,
such as those that would require all seed products containing greater than a specified
amount of GMO product to be labeled as such.  This type of standard would increase
processing and transport costs and is interpreted by many in the industry as a form of
nontariff trade barrier (NTB).
Europe has generally favored a higher standard of segregation of GMOs from non-
GMOs, while the U.S. has argued for less or no segregation.  Suppose a compromise is
reached to harmonize, requiring that Europe drop its standards for segregating GMOs, but
also requiring the U.S. to raise its labeling requirements.  In Europe, producers surplus￿￿
would initially fall as competitive U.S. exports of GMO oilseeds and feedgrains enter the
European market, less impeded by EU standards.  However, European producers would
gain access and the ability to produce GMOs themselves, quickly regaining a competitive
edge.  Consumers surplus would increase with less expensive foodstuffs, but could fall if
consumers fear GMOs as a form of health risk.  Hence the EU negotiating stance on the
proposed harmonized standard will depend on the perceived competitiveness effects on
producers and the perceived health risks to consumers.  (A recent referendum in
Switzerland suggest that opposition to GMOs may be less than thought, making a
European compromise more probable.)  In the U.S., raised labeling requirements may raise
costs and reduce producers surplus, but these costs would be offset by expanded market
access to the EU.  Consumers would gain if the labeling requirements do not appreciably
affect food costs and increase the perception of food safety.
How, then, can one advance virtuous while avoiding vicious paths of trade-
environment interactions?  Neither my virtuous nor my vicious paths suggest that
liberalization automatically leads to environmental improvements.  The virtuous path
presents liberalization as necessary to such improvements, but not sufficient.  The vicious
path, which leads to restricted access and reduced growth, closes off even the necessary
condition.  The analysis and assessment above yields a number of organizing principles for
the conduct of more sustainable trade policies.  I appeal here to four principles for
sustainable trade policy (Runge, et. al., 1997).  ￿￿
Principle 1:  Whenever agricultural trade and environmental policy issues intersect, both sets
of policies should be adjusted so as to maximize the complementarity of trade
reform and environmental sustainability.
It is clear from the record of trade liberalization that environmental considerations
have often been quite separate from strategies of liberalization and have been given much
lower priority.  If higher priority is now to be given to environmental issues, it will require
a new set of instruments, primarily aimed at high pollution and extractive sectors, notably
agriculture.  Both the institutions and technologies required will not occur due to trade
policy reforms alone.  It is also unclear whether the nascent environmental authority
granted to agencies such as NAFTA's Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
are capable of dealing with the wide range of issues involved without substantial
strengthening.
This first principle emphasizes the need for both trade and environmental policies to
be rearranged when problems cut across the two spheres.  Several examples emerge from
the sections above.  First consider upward harmonization of standards for GMOs.  In order
to achieve upward harmonization of such standards, not only must the U.S. and other
OECD countries be prepared to reward such action through maintained market access, but
certain industries must be prepared to face somewhat higher costs of doing business,
notably bulk handlers of commodities.  However, one cannot ask countries to adjust
standards so rapidly that market access gains are wholly dissipated.  The GMO debate
seems more likely, at present, to proceed along a vicious than a virtuous path (see Gray, et.
al., 1995).￿￿
Principle 2:  Sustainable agricultural development will require environmental damages
(externalities) to be explicitly recognized and, where possible, reduced or
eliminated (internalized) through the application of the polluter-pays-principle
or other environment policy reforms that emphasize pollution prevention.
The development and transfer of pollution-preventing technologies in agriculture
will only occur at meaningful levels if governments begin seriously to enforce more
stringent environmental standards, and require violators to pay the costs of environmental
damages.  In the agricultural sector, for example, excessive use of groundwater for
irrigation can only be controlled if such use is carefully monitored and evaluated, and
regulations are put in place that create incentives to establish a scarcity value for its use. 
There are enormous gaps in the regulatory and enforcement capacity of OECD countries
confronting agricultural externalities.
An important issue here relates to claims that agricultural externalities are really an
"implicit subsidy" to agriculture.  Whether non-internalization of externalities is an
implicit subsidy, and thus actionable under the subsidies code or in some other way, turns
on property rights definitions.  Do agriculturalists have the right to pollute?  Thusfar, the
evidence in the OECD is that they do, in which case there is no implicit subsidy from non-
internalization.  If, on the other hand, they are polluters who should pay, but do not, then
they are receiving an implicit subsidy by not internalizing externalities.  Hence, only if the
polluter pays principle applies, but is not enforced, does an implicit subsidy exist from non-
internalization.￿￿
Principle 3:  The uncertainty surrounding both economic and environmental indicators in
agriculture, and rapid technological changes exemplified by biotechnology, all
imply that a proactive set of agricultural trade and environmental policies be
one of "no regrets," in which reforms will prove beneficial no matter what.
The difficulty of establishing definitive linkages from trade to environmental
impacts cannot become a basis for inaction.  Instead, efforts must be undertaken to
mitigate environmental damages.  If it is later learned that trade aggravates these damages,
then a safety net to protect the environment will already be in place.  These issues arise
with particular force in relation to the uncertainties related to crop biotechnologies, and
SPS measures.  Too stringent applications of "no regrets" policies can, unfortunately,
degenerate into agricultural protectionism against any new technologies.
Principle 4:  Implementing both agricultural trade and environmental policy reforms will
require much clearer definitions of property rights, respecting not only goods
and services, but "bads" and "disservices" including environmental pollution.
In many respects, the most important challenge facing the OECD will be to develop
the political will and economic capacity to redefine rights and duties respecting
environmental damages, acknowledging not only that these damages do real harm to
individuals, but that firms and industries cannot escape responsibility for their impacts. 
Expanded trade will require clearer definitions of rights and duties for goods and services. 
A protected environment will require clearer definitions of right and responsibilities for
"bads" and "disservices."  These issues arise with force in the case of intellectual as well as￿￿
physical property, notably in the example of GMOs.  Who will bear the costs of
environmental damages from these innovations, if they occur?  Conversely, who will reap
the benefits that GMOs appear ready to provide?  Will these groups be the same, or
different?
The WTO and Its Program
Although this paper is directed to OECD research and policy, it is clear that the
WTO program will be fundamental as we move toward a new round of multilateral
negotiations in agriculture.  Accordingly, the following comments are made, on the author's
own responsibility, to the WTO and its secretariat.
The post-Uruguay Round experience of the WTO dealing with trade-environment
interactions has been troubled.  The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), formed
in 1995 to confront at least some of the issues, found its report to the Singapore ministerial
in December, 1996 widely criticized (Guruswamy, 1998).  This author (Runge, et. al., 1994)
and Esty (1994) have argued that the WTO cannot be expected to carry the main
responsibility for trade-environment interactions, and it is fairly clear that it will not. 
Shaw (1997, p. 106), reporting on the post-Singapore agenda, recently noted:  "There is no
intention that the WTO should become an environmental agency, nor that it should get
involved in reviewing national environmental priorities, setting environmental standards or
developing global policies on the environment."  Given this institutional gap some (e.g.,
Guruswamy, 1998) have called on existing international bodies, such as the United Nations     
4According to Guruswamy (1998, p. 288):  "Environmentalists have a number of reasons to
fear this assertion of jurisdiction by GATT/WTO.  First, the substantive law of GATT/WTO ignores
international law dealing with environmental protection and treats any law or treaty not
embodied in GATT or its `Covered Agreements' as irrelevant.  Second, the track record of GATT
litigation demonstrates the extent to which international environmental protection has been
diminished.  ...GATT panels view international environmental law trade restrictions as
obstructions to the painfully engineered legal regime created by the GATT/WTO which is aimed
at liberalizing trade by eliminating controls and restrictions.  Third, the judges who interpret
such substantive trade law are unfamiliar with, and possibly unfriendly toward, the laws and
agreements directed at international environmental protection.  Furthermore, these judges are
prevented from engaging in the customary judicial role of interpreting and developing the law."
￿￿
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to fill the void.
4  Others (Runge, et. al., 1994;
Esty, 1994) have called for a more inclusive authority under a World Environment
Organization (WEO).  Realistically, such an authority is unlikely to arise for some time,
although the need for it, based on the same logic as the CEC in Montreal, will eventually
become obvious.
In the interim, it is reasonable to ask how the WTO can structure its programs so as
to deal with trade-environment issues, inside and outside of agriculture, in ways consistent
with the relative lack of understanding of mechanisms, and the failure to integrate trade
and environmental policies.  Having already stated a set of research objectives for OECD,
and a set of principles designed to facilitate sustainable trade expansion, I conclude with a
set of questions (rather than recommendations) for the WTO Secretariat to ponder.
First, does the WTO have an environmental role and responsibility at all, or would it
fare better to externalize all such issues?  Following Principle 1 above, it would seem the
safest course for the WTO to take up issues of environment only where a straightforward
trade rationale is present, and to seek to shift responsibility for environmental questions to
a designated body of environmental experts.  For example, various environmental groups     
5The doctrine of forum non conveniens was described succinctly by Paxton Blair in his
classic article as "the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed
jurisdiction whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more appropriately tried
elsewhere" (Blair, 1929).
￿￿
have recently sought to attack EU fisheries subsidies, and their environmental impacts, as
trade distortions per se.  In such a case, environmental issues really need not arise as a
matter of consideration within the subsidies code at all.  Such subsidies are unlikely to be
defended under the Article XX exceptions!  However, it would be useful for WTO, perhaps
in collaboration with FAO, UNCLOS or other bodies, to have access to a body of
environmental experts to whom environmental issues could be referred for an advisory
opinion.  The consequence of such an exclusionary approach, following the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, would acknowledge the limits of WTO's expertise and authority (see
Guruswamy, 1998).
5
In many ways, the WTO has already signaled its strong aversion to engaging
environmental issues.  However, the lack of an alternative forum for referral underscores
the need for one.  The approach here would presumably resemble the deference paid in
Sanitary and Phytosanitary issues to the Codex Alimentarius of the FAO.  Indeed, it is not
inconceivable that the Codex itself could be expanded to accommodate (at least in the
agricultural sector) expertise on agroenvironmental issues and genetically modified
organisms.
A secondary question for the WTO is:  what deference should be given to such
alternative fora?  If such a group of environmental experts is purely advisory to the dispute
settlement procedures of the WTO, then the implication is that its judgements have no￿￿
binding authority.  Yet, the greater its capacity to exercise such authority, the more likely
are environmental measures that impose on trade liberalization and market access.  My
own opinion, consistent with the principles adumbrated above, is that such an imposition is
both necessary and proper, but must have the authority and integrity of expert opinion,
expertly applied. 
Third, if such a multilateral environmental authority is created, how should WTO seek
to guide its development and evolution?  If the experience with the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) is any guide, trade ministries will
remain jealous of ceding any authority to groups of environmental experts, and will seek to
limit their role and function as much as possible.  Since WTO is essentially an extension of
the trade ministries of its contracting parties, it is therefore unlikely to support any more
than minimal independence for such a group.  Therefore, its political base of support will
be likely to come from NGOs or environmental ministries.  Unfortunately, these groups are
those most suspect to trade ministries, implying a long and laborious process of
institutional innovation before a multilateral environmental authority is created.
Even so, it is this author's opinion that the need for such an institution will lead to
its creation.  Just as the logic of international economic interdependence (a "commercial
commons") created an imperative for the GATT/WTO rules, so the logic of international
ecological interdependence will one day require a separate code defining transnational
rights and obligations to deal with transboundary environmental questions.  In these
matters, agriculture, notably in cases such as SPS and GMOs, may lead the process, in
contrast to its laggard role in the process of commercial trade liberalization under GATT.￿￿
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1Entries of +, 0 and – indicate a significantly positive, insignificant and significantly negative statistical
association at the one-tailed 95th percentile of confidence, respectively.  These correspond to "positive," "none" and
negative in the charts in Appendix I.
2Fixed Effects Time Series Models.  Annual CO2 emissions in 1,000 tons for 113 countries.  All media, water
pollutants and air pollutants measured as emissions flows in lbs. per year per U.S. million dollars of manufactured
output for 96 countries.
3"Wilderness" defined as a minimum of 4,000 km
2 showing no evidence of human development.  Data from
World Resources Institute analysis of aerial photographs.
4"Deforestation" in units of 1,000 hectares.
5"Freshwater withdrawals" in km
3.
6"Marine Catch" in 1,000 tons.
7"Pesticides" in tons of active ingredient.
8NR indicates not reported.
Source:  Adapted from R.E.B. Lucas.  "International Environmental Indicators:  Trade, Income and Endowments." 
Chapter 16 in M.E. Bredahl, et. al. (eds.) Agriculture, Trade and the Environment:  Discovering and Measuring the
Critical Linkages.  Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1996.￿￿
Appendix Table 3.  Changes in Export Shares of Production for Low and High Pollution Intensive Sectors in Latin America
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Source:   P. McGinnis and P. Faeth, WRI, 1997, in Runge, et. al., 1997.￿￿
Appendix Table 4.  Detailed Research Issues*
(1) How much has trade liberalization driven changes in agricutural practices (with
both positive and negative environmental effects) in various OECD countries to
date, and how will it affect these practices in the future?
Specifically:
• What are the causal links from more open trade to farming practices, and then to
environmental impacts?
• Can these causal links be empirically documented?
• Is it necessary to lay the burden of these impacts on trade changes, or should trade
be recognized as simply one factor among many?
• How are environmental benefits from agriculture, such as countryside
maintenance, to be figured in relation to damages and costs?
(2) Will increases in allocative efficiency reflecting comparative advantages in
agriculture result in resource conservation, and if so, how can this "conservation via
efficiency" be promoted (e.g., through adoption of conservation tillage)?
Specifically:
• What case studies can be developed showing the allocative efficiencies and
environment impacts of modern agricultural technologies?
• How has trade expansion increased the rate at which these technologies are
disseminated?
• Can the "product cycle" describing this dissemination be speeded up through
research, policy choices, or coordinated national decision making?
*These are intended to amplify points (1)-(7) on pp. 10-11 of the text.￿￿
Appendix Table 4.  Detailed Research Issues, continued.
(3) As national income growth occurs, what share should be reserved to compensate for
negative externalities in agriculture?  How can intrasectoral environmental issues
(e.g., cotton versus small grains) be given priority?
Specifically:
• Can a relatively simple "damage function" for agricultural externalities be
developed?
• Can this damage function be employed to estimate and compare "producer
damage equivalents" (PDEs) both across countries and intrasectorally, á la PSEs?
• Once such damages are known, can tax/subsidy schemes be targeted to them so
that polluters pay and those who reduce damages are subsidized?
(4) Have trade-induced scale (pollution) effects in agriculture been adequately assessed,
allowing estimates contributing to their remediation as in (3)?
Specifically:
• To what extent are increases in the scale of agricultural activity related to extensive
or intensive use of land, chemical inputs, and water?
• As agricultural scale economies occur in production, do economies of scale also
result for pollution reduction (e.g., waste management in large livestock facilities)?
• Conversely, do smaller scale agricultural enterprises face diseconomies in managing
residuals, externalities, or waste flows?
(5) What is the structure of demand for (a) environmental quality as a public good, and
the (b) remediation of public bads and externalities from agriculture?
Specifically:
• If demands that agricultural polluters pay are upheld, should non-enforcement of
such measures be considered an implicit subsidy?
• Would subsidiarity in responding to environmental externalities create substantial
differences in agricultural production costs across countries?￿￿
Appendix Table 4.  Detailed Research Issues, concluded.
(6) What is the derived demand from (5) for changes in environmental policy, and how
can such policies be successfully coordinated across OECD and developing
countries?
Specifically:
• Is there a role for OECD in advancing more harmonization in agro-environmental
policies?
• Should OECD seek to assist in the creation of global facilities to respond to trade-
environment interactions in agriculture, such as a World Environment
Organization or an expanded Codex Alimentarius?
(7) What technological processes and product characteristics can best promote
environmental improvements in agriculture, without interfering with freer trade?
Specifically:
• Is the product/process distinction capable of being upheld in the face of
technological developments such as biotechnology?
• If not, can better definitions of agricultural "processes" be developed to establish
"green boxes" and "yellow" or "red" boxes where processes are regarded as
environmentally damaging?
• What impact would regulating processes in this way have on technological
innovation in agriculture?